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THE BCE BLUNDER: AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF SHAREHOLDER WEALTH 






INTRODUCTION   
The job of a corporate director has become increasingly complex - gone are the days 
where board members were essentially “rubber stamps” to management initiatives.1 
Currently, the board of directors is the highest governing authority within the 
management structure of any company. Some responsibilities of boards include 
selecting, evaluating, and approving compensation for the company’s chief executive 
officer, approving the company’s financial statements and paying dividends. One of the 
most difficult decisions that a director may face has to do with recommendations on 
change of control transactions. 
 
Changes of control include transactions where shareholders lose control of the 
corporation or where the corporation ceases to exist.2 This type of transaction represents 
a significant event in the existence of any company. The most common change of 
control transaction is the sale of a corporation. It is the responsibility of the board to 
recommend whether or not shareholders should approve any change of control.  
 
When making determinations with regard to changes in control, directors are guided by 
their fiduciary duty. This duty requires them to act in “the best interests of the 
corporation”. Unfortunately, understanding what acting in “the best interests of the 
corporation” entails may be a more difficult task than determining whether or not to 
recommend the sale of a company.  
 
One of the main issues with the “best interests of the corporation” standard is that 
corporations are made up of multiple interests with independent goals and welfare 
concerns. For example, during a change of control transaction, shareholders will seek to 
                                                
* Patrick Lupa completed his J.D. at Queen's University and his LL.M. at the University of 
Toronto. Before entering law school, Patrick completed a B.A. (Honours) at the University of 
Windsor. He is currently articling at Osler, Hoskin and Harcourt in Toronto, Ontario. 
 
1 James Westphal & Edward Zajac, “Defections from the Inner Circle: Social Exchange, 
Reciprocity, and the Diffusion of Board Independence in U.S. Corporations” (1997) Admin Sci Q, 
Vol 42.  
2 Mohammad Fadel, “BCE and the Long Shadow of American Corporate Law” (2009) 48 CBLJ 
190 at 201 [Fadel]. 
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maximize the value of their shares, employees will seek job security, and creditors will 
want to ensure that their loans continue be repaid. Given these largely conflicting goals, 
it is almost impossible for a director to please all interested parties.  
 
Two theoretical models provide guidance to directors as to what “the best interests of the 
corporation” standard requires: shareholder primacy and stakeholder theory.3 Generally, 
shareholder primacy necessitates that directors maximize shareholder value when 
making decisions. Although directors may consider the interests of other stakeholders, 
they are unable to act in a way that has a negative impact on shareholders. 
 
Conversely, stakeholder theory contemplates a broader social role for corporations. 
Stakeholder theorists argue that unilateral focus on shareholder wealth fails to recognize 
that groups outside of shareholders are integral to the success of the corporation. 
According to stakeholder theory, directors’ fiduciary duties should require them to 
contemplate a broader range of interests than just shareholders.  
 
The Supreme Court of Canada recently weighed in on the debate in the cases of Peoples 
v Wise4 and BCE v 1976 Debentureholders5. These decisions stand for the proposition 
that directors’ fiduciary duties permit them to consider the interests of a wide variety of 
stakeholders when making a determination. In the change of control context, directors 
are free to consider the interests of all corporate constituents prior to recommending 
whether or not shareholders should approve a given transaction.    
 
This paper will explore some of the issues that Peoples and BCE raise. It will be argued 
that directors’ duties should require them to focus exclusively on increasing shareholder 
value in the change of control context. Although ensuring that stakeholder interests are 
not disregarded is an important goal, mechanisms such as contracting, legislation and the 
political process provide an effective regime for protecting stakeholders. In contrast, 
shareholders status as residual claimants necessitates that they be protected by an 
exclusive fiduciary duty.  
 
The paper will be broken into three sections. Section I will examine the case law and 
legislation, which detail the content of fiduciary duties in Canada. Section II will critique 
the fiduciary duties outlined by the Supreme Court in Peoples and BCE. Section III will 
outline a variety of arguments as to why directors’ fiduciary duties should require them 




                                                
3 More recently other theories have emerged including team production theory and director 
primacy. For a discussion on each see Margret Blair & Lynn Stout “A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law” (1999) 85 Vir LR 247 and Stephen Bainbridge “Director Primacy: The Means and 
Ends of Corporate Governance” (2003) 97 Nw ULR 548 [Bainbridge]. 
4 Peoples v Wise, 2004 SCC 68 [Peoples].  
5 2008 SCC 68 [BCE]. 





I. DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES: WHO’S BEST INTERESTS? 
 
Although traditionally a common law duty, Canadian directors’ fiduciary duties are 
currently set out in section 122 of the Canada Business Corporations Act.6 The section 
provides that “every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and 
discharging their duties shall act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best 
interests of the corporation.”7 Generally, the purpose of imposing fiduciary duties on 
directors is to ensure that they carry out their responsibilities with the utmost good faith, 
that they do not act in their own interests and that they are loyal to the corporation when 
executing their roles and responsibilities.8  
 
This section of the paper will trace how courts have interpreted the “best interests of the 
corporation” standard. Part A examines some early decisions which seemingly set a 
strict shareholder primacy approach requiring directors to focus their decision-making 
power exclusively on maximizing shareholder value. This part also outlines some other 
corporate law principles that have diluted the strict shareholder primacy approach. Part B 
examines how courts have interpreted the “best interests of the corporation” standard in 
the change of control context. Finally, Part C examines the approach to fiduciary duties 
outlined by the Supreme Court in BCE.  
 
A. The Traditional Approach: Shareholder Interests as Paramount? 
 
The current directors’ fiduciary duty traces back to a comprehensive report examining 
corporate law in Canada by the Dickerson Committee.9 By suggesting such a wide 
provision, the Dickerson Committee implicitly contemplated the involvement of courts 
in fleshing out the content of directors’ fiduciary duties.10 However, the courts were not 
left without any guidance. At the time the CBCA was amended, there existed a 
substantial body of common law that addressed the meaning of the “best interests of the 
corporation.”  
 
Some early articulations of directors’ fiduciary duties equated the “best interests of the 
corporation” with the best interests of shareholders. This view was largely grounded in 
the notion that shareholders owned the corporation due to their capital contribution.11 
                                                
6 [1985] c 44 [CBCA].  Canadian provincial corporate law statutes vary slightly with regard to 
directors’ fiduciary duties. This paper will focus on the duty found in s 122 of the CBCA.  
7 CBCA, supra note 6.   
8 Harris et al., Cases, Materials and Notes on Partnerships and Canadian Business Corporations, 
4th ed (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2004).   
9 Robert Dickerson et al, Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada, vol 1 
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971). 
10 See Mohamed Khimji, “Peoples v. Wise – Conflating Directors Duties, Oppression, and 
Stakeholder Protection” (2006) 39 UBC L Rev 209 at 212 [Khimji]. (Khimji also suggests that the 
duty was set up in such a way as to accommodate “evolutions in the law to reflect shifts in 
attitudes and values” at 212).   
11 Milton Freedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits” The New 
York Times Magazine (September 13, 1970).  
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One of the first cases to articulate the position was Hutton v West Cork Railway 
Company.12 In the seminal judgment, Bowen J. pronounced: “the law does not say that 
there are no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are 
required for the benefit of the company,” and the company means the shareholders.13 
 
This shareholder-focused view of the corporation was adopted less than 40 years later in 
the infamous Dodge v Ford Motor Co case.14 In Dodge, shareholders’ complained 
directors had breached their fiduciary duty when they decided to allocate corporate 
profits to lowering the cost of cars and increasing employment opportunities within the 
community rather than paying out dividends. Examining the obligation of directors, the 
court noted that: 
  
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit 
of stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that 
end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to 
attain that end and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the 
reduction of profits or the non-distribution of profits among stockholders 
in order to devote them to other purposes.15  
 
The court in Dodge envisioned a strict requirement that directors focus solely on 
maximizing shareholder value.16 However, the decision is somewhat of an outlier and 
the shareholder primacy approach has become significantly more nuanced through the 
operation of other corporate law principles, such as the business judgment rule.  
 
The business judgment rule has played an important role in expanding director discretion 
to allow for consideration of corporate constituents other than shareholders. The rule 
developed, in part, due to judicial reluctance to interfere ex post with board decisions. 
Given the difficult nature of the determinations that directors make, and the potential for 
hindsight bias, courts have given deference to boards provided they act in good faith and 
on a reasonably informed basis. The impact of the business judgment rule has been to 
insulate many board decisions from court scrutiny. As noted by Iacobucci, “[b]usiness 
judgment deference gives corporate decision-makers wide discretion to make decisions 
that may in fact advance the interests of one group of stakeholders over another 
regardless of the precise formulation of the fiduciary duty.”17 
 
                                                
12 (1883), 23 Ch D 654 [Hutton].  
13 Ibid.  
14 (1919) 204 Mich 459 at 684, 170 NW 668 [Dodge]. 
15 Dodge, supra note 14 [Emphasis added].  
16 Contra Gordon Smith, “The Shareholder Primacy Norm” (1998) 23 J of Corp L 277 (Smith 
argues that shareholder primacy was originally introduced to resolve disputes between majority 
and minority shareholders, not to place the interests of shareholders above stakeholders.) 
17 Edward Iacobucci, “Indeterminacy and the Canadian Court’s Approach to Corporate Fiduciary 
Duties” (2009) 48 Can J Bus L 232 at 242 [Iacobucci]. 





In addition, corporations have long been involved in donating to charity. In 2000, 
corporations made over ten billion dollars in contributions.18 Interpreted strictly, 
shareholder primacy would not allow for such donations, as they relocate wealth from 
shareholders to other groups. However, the common law has developed a body of case 
law permitting corporate donations provided they are reasonable.19 The ability of 
corporations to give to charity is another illustration of how shareholder primacy has 
been diluted through different corporate law rules.  
 
Finally, the oppression remedy requires that directors consider the reasonable 
expectations of other parties when making decisions. For example, directors may be 
required to consider the reasonable expectations of creditors where a given course of 
action impacts their interests. Although originally developed to protect the interests of 
minority shareholders, the oppression remedy has broadened to protect the expectations 
of other stakeholders.20 The consequences of breaching the oppression remedy are severe 
and can include setting aside a corporate transaction.21 The oppression remedy is an 
example of a corporate law doctrine that specifically requires directors to consider the 
expectations of certain stakeholders (mainly creditors) when making a determination.  
  
B. Obligation to Maximize Shareholder Value in the Change of Control Context  
 
Although a strict approach to shareholder primacy has rarely been applied to director 
decision-making, one area where the theory has gained some traction with the courts is 
in the change of control context. Prior to BCE, two competing lines of case law 
developed with regard to directors’ duties in the change of control context.22  The first 
line required directors to focus exclusively on maximizing shareholder value when it 
became clear that the corporation was going to be sold. The second line contemplated 
the consideration of groups outside of shareholders when making determinations with 




                                                
18 Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell, “Management and Control of the Modern Business 
Corporation: Corporate Speech and Citizenship: Corporate Charitable Giving” (2002) 69 U Chi L 
Rev 1191 at 1197.   
19 See Adam Winkler, “Corporate Law of the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate 
Governance at the End of History” (2004) 67 Law & Contemp Probs 109 at 115-119 [Winkler].  
20 Courts have been reluctant to give employees standing to make claims under the oppression 
remedy. See, Daniels v Fielder (1988), 52 DLR (4th) 424 (Ont HC).   
21 CBCA, supra note 6 at s 241(3)(h).  
22 There is some debate on the issue. See Darcy L MacPherson, “The Supreme Court Restates 
Directors’ Fiduciary Duty – A Comment on Peoples Department Store v. Wise” (2005) 43 Alta L 
Rev 383 at 390 [MacPherson]. Compare Ian Lee “Peoples Department Stores v. Wise and the 
‘Best Interests of the Corporation’” (2004) 41 Can Bus LJ 212 at 216 [Lee] and Colin Feasby 
“Bondholders and Barbarians: BCE and The Supreme Court’s New View on Directors’ Duties” 
The Annual Review of Civil Litigation (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2009) at 97 [Feasby]. 
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i. Maximizing Shareholder Value in the Change of Control Context  
 
Certain Canadian courts have interpreted directors’ fiduciary duties as requiring them to 
maximize shareholder value in the change of control context. In this respect, American 
corporate law has heavily influenced Canadian law. The duty to maximize shareholder 
value in the United States was articulated in Revlon v MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings.23 In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court found that once the sale of a 
company is inevitable, a board has an obligation to maximize shareholder value through 
holding an auction.24 This requirement is colloquially referred to as “Revlon duties”.  
 
The main justification for such a stringent rule is based on the inherent conflict of 
interest directors confront when involved in control transactions.25 Where a corporation 
changes ownership, directors face the possibility that their position will be terminated. 
As such, there is a concern that directors will act in their own interests. The concern over 
self-interested directors was outlined in Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co, with Moore 
J. commenting that in the takeover context there is an “omnipresent spectre that a board 
may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its 
shareholders.”26 By requiring directors to focus on the narrow mandate of maximizing 
shareholder value, the ability of a director to act in a self-interested manner is severely 
curtailed. 
 
Subsequent courts have refined the principle outlined in Revlon. In Paramount 
Communications, Inc v Time, Inc,27 the court commented on what circumstances trigger 
Revlon duties. According to Horsey J., Revlon duties will only be triggered where a 
corporation puts itself up for sale and initiates a bidding process to effect a 
reorganization involving a break up or when, in response to a bid, a company seeks an 
alternative transaction. The court essentially found that Revlon only applies where a 
company has determined to sell itself off to the highest bidder - at that point directors’ 
duties are owed exclusively to the shareholders. As one commentator has argued, Revlon 
has been “tamed” by Time.28  
 
Further clarification on the content of Revlon duties was provided in Paramount 
Communications v QVC.29 There the court interpreted Relvon in the following way: 
“when a corporation undertakes a transaction which will cause: (a) a change in corporate 
control; or (b) a break-up of the corporate entity, the directors’ obligation is to seek the 
best value reasonably available to stockholders.”30 However, in a merger of two public 
companies, where both “would be owned by a fluid aggregation of unaffiliated 
                                                
23 Revlon v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A 2d 173 (Del SC 1985) [Revlon]. 
24 Ibid at 12.  
25 A conflict of interest does not require an actual conflict but only the appearance of a conflict.  
26 Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co, 493 A 2d 946 (Del Super 1985) at 954 [Unocal].  
27 571 A 2d 1140 (Del 1989) [Time].  
28 Theodore N Mirvis, “Time/Warner: The Delaware Supreme Court Speaks” (1990) 4 Merg & 
Acq L Rep 287. 
29 637 A 2d 34 (Del 1993) [QVC].  
30 Ibid at 48.  





stockholders both before and after the merger”, and neither company could be said to be 
acquiring the other, the court held there was no change of control and Revlon duties were 
not invoked.31 As with the decision in Time, QVC curtailed the circumstances in which 
Revlon duties arise. It is only when a corporation is actively engaged in a transaction, 
which changes corporate control or breaks up the corporate entity, that directors have an 
obligation to maximize shareholder value. 
 
As in many other situations, developments south of the border did not go unnoticed in 
Canada. Canadian courts confronted with issues of directors’ fiduciary duties in the 
change of control context naturally looked to the extensive body of American fiduciary 
law. The initial case law adopted a similar shareholder centric approach to that found in 
the United States. 
 
In CW Shareholdings Inc v WIC Western International Communication Ltd, the Ontario 
Court of Justice embraced Revlon duties. Blair J. noted, directors have a duty “to act in 
the best interests of the shareholders as a whole and to take active reasonable steps to 
maximize shareholder value by conducting an auction.”32 He went on to acknowledge 
the unavoidable conflict of interest that directors find themselves in when faced with a 
hostile takeover bid and advised that “retaining independent legal advice and financial 
advisors, and the establishment of independent or special directors” are additional 
responses to potential conflicts of interest.33  
 
In Pente Investment Management Ltd v Schneider Corp, the Ontario Court of Appeal had 
the opportunity to comment on directors’ fiduciary duties in the change of control 
context.34 Weiler J. was of the opinion that directors are under an obligation to obtain 
“the best value reasonably available to shareholders in the circumstances.”35 Although 
the court went on to reject the decision in Revlon, it is likely that the rejection was aimed 
at the procedural requirement of holding an auction rather than the obligation to 
maximize shareholder value.36 As Weiler J. noted, an auction is just one way to 
minimize conflicts of interest during change of control transactions:  
 
If a board of directors has acted on the advice of a committee composed of 
persons having no conflict of interest, and that committee has acted 
                                                
31 Ibid at 46.  
32 CW Shareholdings Inc v WIC Western International Communication Ltd (1998), 39 OR (3d) 
755 (Gen Div [Commercial List]) at 768-769. 
33 Ibid at 769.  
34 Pente Investment Management Ltd v Schneider Corp (sub nom Maple Leaf Foods Inc v 
Schneider) (1998), 42 OR (3d) 177 (CA) [Pente].  
35 Ibid at 62.  
36 Ibid (The court noted that: “In Ontario, an auction need not be held every time there is a change 
in control of a company. An auction is merely one way to prevent the conflicts of interest that may 
arise when there is a change of control by requiring that directors act in a neutral manner toward a 
number of bidders...the obligation of directors when there is a bid for change of control is an 
obligation to seek the best value reasonably available to shareholders in the circumstances. This is 
a more flexible standard.” [Emphasis added]) 
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independently, in good faith, and made an informed recommendation as to 
the best available value available to shareholders in the circumstances, the 
business judgment rule applies.37  
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal revisited the question of directors’ duties in the change of 
control context in Ventas Inc v Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Investment Trust. Here 
the court reiterated the shareholder-focused approach to the change of control context 
stating, “[t]here is no doubt that the directors of a corporation that is the target of a 
takeover bid ... has a duty to maximize shareholder (or unit holder) value in the 
process...”38  
 
ii. Contemplating Interests Outside of Shareholders  
 
As the jurisprudence above indicates, there is a strong line of case law taking the 
position that directors’ duties require them to maximize shareholder value in the change 
of control context. However, not all courts were in agreement. At the same time, a 
competing line of case law developed which took the position that directors’ duties 
permit contemplation of non-shareholder interests in the change of control context.  
 
The case of Tech Corp Limited v Millar represents the first occasion that a Canadian 
court stated that directors may consider interests outside of shareholders in the change of 
control context. Despite being a lower court decision, this case is a watershed in 
Canadian takeover jurisprudence. When speaking about defensive measures aimed at 
stopping a hostile takeover bid, Berger J. noted:  
 
I appreciate that it would be a breach of their duty for directors to 
disregard entirely the interests of a company’s shareholder in order to 
confer a benefit on its employees... But if they observe a decent respect for 
other interests lying beyond those of the company’s shareholder in the 
strict sense, that will not, in my view leave directors open to the charge 
that they have failed in their fiduciary duty to the company.39  
 
Commentators have argued Tech asserts the position that Canadian courts have 
recognized that a director’s fiduciary duty contemplates considerations of corporate 
constituents in addition to shareholders.40 Others have argued that the comments made 
by Berger J. were obiter41 and that these comments were not intended to reject 
shareholder primacy.42 
 
                                                
37 Ibid at 38.  
38 Ventas Inc v Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Investment Trust (2007), 85 OR (3d) 354 at para 
34 (CA).  
39 Tech Corp Limited v Millar (1972), [1973] 2 WWR 385 at para 104 (BC SC).  
40 Feasby, supra note 22 at 97.   
41 Wayne Gray, “Peoples v. Wise and Dylex: Identifying Stakeholder Interests Upon or Near 
Corporate Insolvency – Stasis or Pragmatism?” (2003) 39 CBLJ 242 at 243.  
42 MacPherson, supra note 22 at 391.  





The Supreme Court of Canada took the opportunity to remark on the decision in Tech, 
and their conception of directors’ fiduciary duties in the case of Peoples v Wise.43  
Although the case did not involve a change of control transaction, the court here set 
down their position on the fiduciary duties of directors more broadly.  
 
The case arose following the 1992 Wise stores acquisition of Peoples department stores. 
Within two years of the transaction, Peoples’ business began to fall on tough times. In 
order to alleviate cost concerns the Wise brothers (who were directors and officers of 
both companies) decided to implement an inventory procurement policy.44 Rather than 
purchasing separate inventory, the policy required inventory to be purchased by Peoples 
and subsequently be given to Wise on credit. The new inventory policy was ultimately 
unsuccessful and Peoples was forced into bankruptcy. At the time, Wise owed Peoples 
$18 million for unpaid inventory.45 The Trustee in Bankruptcy for Peoples alleged that 
the Wise brothers had breached their fiduciary duty to Peoples by placing the interests of 
Wise’s creditors above People’s creditors.46  
 
When the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada, the court framed the issue to be 
determined as whether “directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation’s creditors 
comparable to the statutory duty owed to the corporation.”47 The court rejected the 
argument that directors owe a fiduciary duty to creditors and further stated that directors 
do not owe a fiduciary duty to any constituent making up the corporation. Accordingly 
to the court:  
 
[I]t is clear that the phrase “best interests of the corporation” should be 
read not simply as the “best interests of shareholders”. From an economic 
perspective, the “best interests of the corporation” means maximizing the 
value of the corporation. However, the courts have long recognized that 
various other factors may be relevant in determining what directors should 
consider in soundly managing with a view to the best interests of the 
corporation.48 
  
The court rejected shareholder primacy, finding that directors may consider interests 
outside of shareholders when making decisions. Rather than simply focusing on 
shareholder value, a director is required to act in the best interests of the corporation. In 
doing so they may consider a variety of groups including, intra alia, shareholders, 
employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.49 
                                                
43 It has been argued that the Supreme Court was not obligated to take a position on the issue at all. 
See, Khimji, supra note 10.  
44 Peoples, supra note 4 at 15.  
45 Ibid at 20.  
46 Ibid at 25.  
47 Ibid at 1.  
48 Peoples, supra note 4 at 42 [Emphasis added].   
49 Ibid at 42.  
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Directors should strive to create “a ‘better’ corporation, and not to favour the interests of 
any one group of stakeholders.”50 
 
The Peoples decision seemed to raise more questions than answers. It remained unclear 
whether directors were required to consider the interests of stakeholders and if directors 
could make a decision that favoured stakeholders’ interests over that of shareholders. 
Also, as the case arose outside of the change of control context, commentators were left 
wondering whether the law outlined in Peoples would apply in that context.51  
 
C. The BCE Decision  
 
In BCE v 1976 Debentureholders, the Supreme Court grappled with some of the 
questions that emerged from their decision in Peoples. BCE involved a $52 billion 
transaction, the largest leverage buy-out in Canadian history, to be effected by a plan of 
arrangement under the CBCA.52 The transaction came about when BCE’s board decided 
to put the company in play. The board established a special committee, which was 
charged with the objective of “maximizing the interests of shareholders while respecting 
the rights of bondholders.”53 The committee set up an auction process that elicited three 
bids, all of which were structured as leveraged buy-outs. 
 
The highest bid was made by a consortium led by Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan and 
represented a 40% premium to the closing price of BCE shares. Under the arrangement, 
Bell Canada, a wholly owned subsidiary of BCE, would be required to guarantee 
approximately $30 billion of new debt.54 Ninety-Seven percent of shareholders approved 
the arrangement.55 
 
The increased debt load of Bell Canada resulted in its debentures being downgraded 
below investment grade and a subsequent drop in trading value by approximately 20%.56 
In response, the debentureholders launched a challenge claiming the transaction was 
oppressive under section 241 of the CBCA and not fair and reasonable under section 192 
of the CBCA. 
 
At trial, the Quebec Superior Court dismissed the oppression claim and approved the 
transaction as fair and reasonable.57 The court reasoned that in these circumstances the 
                                                
50 Ibid at 47.  
51 Wayne Gray, “A Solicitor’s Perspective on Peoples v. Wise” (2005) 41 Can Bus LJ 184 at 189-
190 [Gray].  
52 The Quebec Superior Court’s decision is comprised of five separate judgments: BCE Inc, Re 
(2008), 43 BLR (4th) 1 (Que. S.C.); BCE Inc, Re (2008), 43 BLR (4th) 39 (Que SC); BCE Inc, Re 
(2008), 43 BLR (4th) 69; BCE Inc, Re (2008), 43 BLR (4th) 79 (Que SC) [BCE Trial Oppression]; 
BCE Inc, Re (2008), 43 BLR (4th) 135 (Que SC). 
53 Ibid at 52.  
54 Ibid at 89.  
55 BCE supra, note 5 at 19. 
56 Ibid at 4.  
57 BCE Trial Oppression, supra note 52. 





board had acted reasonably in determining that their fiduciary duty required them to 
maximize shareholder value. The reasonable expectations of the debentureholders were 
restricted to the contractual agreements in place.58   
 
The Quebec Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling and refused to approve the 
transaction.59 The court, relying on Peoples, rejected the position that the board had an 
obligation to maximize shareholder value.60 They further stated the board was required 
to consider the interests and reasonable expectations of the debentureholders.  The court 
was of the opinion that statements made in offering materials and public reports created 
reasonable expectations among debentureholders that BCE would structure the deal in a 
way that did not negatively impact their financial interests.61 As BCE failed to produce 
any evidence that they attempted to accommodate the debentureholders’ reasonable 
expectations, the court was unable to find the arrangement to be fair and reasonable.62  
 
The Supreme Court of Canada overturned the Quebec Court of Appeal decision. The 
court determined that the plan of arrangement was fair and reasonable and that the BCE 
board did not act oppressively towards the debentureholders. The court found the board 
had considered the debentureholders’ reasonable expectations and acted reasonably in 
accepting the highest offer.63 The unanimous court again took the opportunity to 
comment on directors’ fiduciary duties and how those duties interact with the oppression 
remedy. The following sub-parts outline the approach the court in BCE took to fiduciary 
duties and the oppression remedy.    
 
i. What Does the Fiduciary Duty Entail? 
 
The court noted that a director’s fiduciary duty is a “broad, contextual concept”.64 The 
content of the duty will vary depending on the situation at hand and there are no absolute 
rules. The duty is mandatory and, at minimum, it requires directors to ensure that the 
corporation meets its statutory obligations.65 
 
ii. To Who Is the Duty Owed?  
 
The court affirmed Peoples and stated that the fiduciary duty is owed to the corporation. 
Directors are required to act in the best interests of the corporation.66 No one particular 
set of interests is paramount. The corporation’s interests are not synonymous with the 
interests of shareholders or any other stakeholder. They noted that, when the corporation 
                                                
58 Ibid at 133.  
59 BCE Inc, Re (2008), 43 BLR (4th) 157 (Que CA) [BCE QCA].  
60 Ibid at 99-100.  
61 Ibid at 106. 
62 Ibid at 117. 
63 BCE, supra note 5 at 113.  
64 Ibid at 66. 
65 Ibid at 37. 
66 BCE, supra note 5 at 66. 
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is a going concern, the duty of the director looks to the long-term interests of the 
corporation.67  
 
iii. Who May be Considered? 
 
Although not mandatory, in certain circumstances, it may be appropriate to consider the 
interests of shareholders and other corporate stakeholders.68 Affirming Peoples, the court 
stated that boards may look to the interests of shareholders, employees, creditors, 
consumers, government and the environment to inform their decisions.69 Courts are to 
give appropriate deference to consideration of ancillary interests under the business 
judgment rule.70 Thus, provided that it is “within a range of reasonable alternatives” to 
“take into account these ancillary interests” courts will not scrutinize a board’s 
decision.71 
 
iv. Who Must Be Considered?  
 
In certain circumstances, boards will be obligated to consider shareholder and 
stakeholder interests. The obligation arises under the oppression remedy, which requires 
directors to consider the reasonable expectations of all groups whose interests are 
implicated by a given course of action. When determining whether a party has 
reasonable expectations, factors such as commercial practice, the size, nature and 
structure of the corporation, the relationship between the parties, past practice, the failure 
to negotiate protection, agreements and representations and the fair resolution of 
conflicting interests are relevant considerations.72 
 
A fundamental component of a corporate constituent’s reasonable expectations includes 
being treated equitably and fairly.73 Reasonable expectations are not confined to legal 
interests.74 When making a decision that impacts a corporate constituent, the board will 
be obligated to consider their reasonable expectations.  However, not all reasonable 
expectations give rise to oppression under section 241 of the CBCA. In addition to 
showing reasonable expectations, a claimant must establish that the disregard of the 
reasonable expectations amounts to oppression, unfair prejudice, or unfair disregard in 
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v. Where Interests Conflict? 
 
The court recognized in certain circumstances the interests of corporate constituents may 
conflict.75 Conflicting interests are to be resolved by directors by acting in “the best 
interests of the corporation”.76 The oppression cases indicate that directors have a duty to 
treat stakeholders affected by corporate decision-making fairly and equitably.77 
However, provided that a decision is in a range of reasonableness, it will be protected 
under the business judgment rule. 
 
No set of interests – for example shareholder interests – should prevail over other 
interests. However, the court did observe: “[t]he corporation and shareholders are 
entitled to maximize profit and share value, to be sure, but not by treating individual 
stakeholders unfairly.”78 The court rejected Revlon and stated that the “fundamental 
rule” is that the duty of directors is “a function of business judgment of what is in the 
best interests of the corporation, in the particular situation it faces.”79 
 
When applying the above reasons to the case at hand, the court stated that “[i]n this case, 
the Board considered the interests of the claimant stakeholders. Having done so, and 
having considered its options in the difficult circumstances it faced, it made its decision, 
acting in what it perceived to be in the best interests of the corporation.”80 Based on this 
analysis, the court determined that the BCE board had fulfilled their fiduciary duty and 
had not acted in an oppressive manner.  
 
 
II. CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT FIDUCIARY DUTY IN CANADA 
 
The BCE decision has received a tremendous amount of attention since its release in 
December 2008. Commentators have commended the Supreme Court for the expedited 
manner in which it heard and rendered the decision.81 There clarify the decision in 
Peoples, it appears that the court further complicated the law with regard to directors’ 
fiduciary duties and how they operate in the change of control context.  
 
This section of the paper will raise a number of issues with the BCE duty and how it 
applies to control transactions. 82 Part A will argue that the BCE duty is indeterminate 
and raises a number of concerns, which result from such a duty. Part B will show how 
the BCE duty has left directors with no useful guidance for dealing with control 
                                                
75 BCE, supra note 5 at 64. 
76 Ibid at 81. 
77 Ibid at 82. 
78 Ibid at 64. 
79 Ibid at  87.  
80 Ibid at 104. 
81 Iacobucci, supra note 17 at 233.  
82 The remainder of the paper will refer to the duty as outlined in Peoples and BCE as the “BCE 
duty”. 
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transactions. Part C discusses how the Supreme Court’s use of inconsistent theoretical 
conceptions of the corporation in BCE clouds the meaning of the decision.  
 
A. “The Best interests of a Corporation”: An Indeterminate Duty  
 
The fiduciary duty outlined in BCE fails to meet a very basic rule of law: “laws should 
be written with reasonable clarity to avoid unfair enforcement.”83 The BCE duty is 
vague, uncertain84 and indeterminate.85 The Supreme Court did not equate the term “best 
interests of the corporation” with any corporate constituent. Rather, the corporation is 
treated as an entity in and of itself, which directors are required to act in “the best 
interests of”. The difficulty with such a standard is that the term “best interests of the 
corporation” does not provide any guidance to directors confronted with a possible 
change of control transaction. The phrase is unclear. The ambiguity lies in the fact that 
the doctrine of corporate legal personality does not translate into fiduciary law. 
 
Established in the seminal judgment of Solomon v Solomon & Co.86, the doctrine of 
separate legal personality recognizes corporations as separate legal persons bearing the 
rights and capacities of a natural person. The purpose of this classification is to separate 
the assets and liabilities of the corporation from the individuals investing in it.  From a 
policy perspective, the doctrine was introduced to encourage individuals to invest in 
corporations through the knowledge that they would not be personally liable for any 
debts or liabilities the corporation incurs.  
 
Although classifying corporations as separate legal persons serves a useful function, the 
doctrine does not translate effectively into the fiduciary law context. The essential 
problem of articulating a director’s duty in terms of “the best interests of the 
corporation” is that a corporation does not have independent interests in any meaningful 
sense. The categorization of corporations as legal persons is a matter of convenience 
rather than reality – it is a legal fiction.87 It is the constituents that lay behind the 
corporation – employees, shareholders, creditors, suppliers, etc. – whose interests are 
implicated through the corporation’s activities.   
 
A corporation serves as a vehicle through which corporate constituents can pursue 
different ends. Each group will have independent purposes they hope to achieve through 
their interaction with the corporation. Shareholders seek to make returns on their 
investments, employees seek job security and wages, and creditors seek loan repayment. 
                                                
83 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev ed (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1969). 
84 MacPherson, supra note 22 at 402 (Arguing that rather than a fundamental shift to a stakeholder 
model, the court in Peoples simply “may have been trying to ‘tweak’ the law of directors’ duties, 
but they may have unintentionally gotten more than they bargained for.” at 396).   
85 Iacobucci, supra note 17 at 233-241.  
86 [1897] AC 22 (HL). The modern version of the doctrine is found in section 15 of the CBCA (“A 
corporation has the capacity and, subject to this Act, the rights, powers and privileges of a natural 
person.”) 
87 Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, “The Corporate Contract” (1989) 89 Colum L Rev 
1416 at 1426 [Easterbrook].  





Unlike any of those constituents, the legal entity known as the corporation has no 
independent goals or welfare concerns.88  
 
Where a given course of action benefits all stakeholders, acting in the “best interests of 
the corporation” will be a simple standard to satisfy. Directors can easily justify a 
decision as being in the “best interests of the corporation” if every corporate constituent 
benefits from it. Difficulties arise where constituent interests conflict. A change of 
control transaction represents a situation where the interests of corporate constituents 
have an increased likelihood of conflicting.89 An effective fiduciary duty recognizes this 
probable conflict and provides a meaningful tool for resolving it. The indeterminate duty 
articulated in BCE provides directors with no useful guidance. As Professor MacIntosh 
points out, “[t]he Supreme Court appears to expect corporate directors, and judges ex 
post facto, to function as an enlightened breed of Philosopher Kings ardently and 
faithfully pursuing some elusive Aristotelian mean.”90  
 
The indeterminacy of the BCE duty is problematic on a number of levels. First, boards 
will have little guidance when making decisions.91 Directors are forced to wait for lower 
court decisions to explain how to discharge their duty.92 This problem is further 
magnified in the change of control context, where a predictable legal system allows for 
increased deal certainty.  
 
Second, the increased discretion afforded to directors makes it ever more difficult to 
challenge board decisions.93 The BCE duty provides an uncertain standard which limits 
directorial accountable.94 Directors inclined on protecting their own interests may reject 
transactions under the guise of protecting a given stakeholder. Apart from blatantly self-
interested or unreasonable board decisions, courts will be unlikely to interfere with 
director decision-making. Empowered with this insulation from challenge, dishonest 
directors may try to entrench themselves or misbehave in other ways.95  
 
                                                
88Iacobucci, supra note 17 at 235 (“[t]o speak of the legal fiction that is the corporation as having a 
‘best interests’ is nonsensical. A legal fiction does not have welfare gains or losses that we care 
about” at 235.) 
89 One need not look further than the facts of BCE as an example of how various corporate 
constituents will not always agree on a given course of action. In BCE the shareholders stood to 
gain a 40% return while the debentureholders bonds were expected to decrease 20% in value.   
90 Jeffrey MacIntosh, “BCE and the Peoples’ Corporate Law: Learning to Live on Quicksand” 
(2009) 48 Can Bus LJ 255 at 256 [MacIntosh].  
91 Alex Moore, “BCE Inc. (Re): An Unexamined Question Considered” (2009) 48 Can Bus LJ 273 
at 278 [Moore]. 
92 MacPherson, supra note 22 at 402.  
93 Gray, supra note 51 at 190. 
94 James Tory, “A Comment on BCE Inc.” (2009) 48 Can Bus LJ 285 at 286 [Tory]. 
95 Feasby, supra note 22 at 86 and 119; MacIntosh, supra note 90 at 255-256. 
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Finally, the indeterminate BCE duty is of little value to any corporate stakeholder. As 
explained by Macey and Millar, “fiduciary duties are not public goods.”96 As more 
groups enjoy fiduciary protection, the value associated with such protection decreases. If 
directors are permitted to consider multiple constituents when making a decision, there is 
no guaranteeing that a particular group will take priority over another. Thus, a fiduciary 
duty that fails to provide certainty to a party protected by it will be of little to no value. 
Any protection provided by a fiduciary duty that allows for consideration of multiple 
parties is of minor significance, as a corporate constituent will never know if their 
interests will be guarded in a given circumstance.97 There is little purpose in having a 
duty which provides no guarantee of protection for any party, be they shareholder or 
stakeholder. 
 
B. Uncertainty: What Action Should a Board Take In the Change of Control Context  
 
One of the most dissatisfying aspects of the BCE judgment is what it does not say. The 
Supreme Court failed to comment on directors’ duties in the change of control context. 
The court ignored a substantial body of jurisprudence that has taken the position that 
where a corporation is involved in a change of control transaction, focus should be 
placed on maximizing shareholder value.98  
 
The Supreme Court took the position that, as a factual matter, BCE was “facing certain 
takeover” and that “BCE had been put in play, and the momentum of the market made a 
buyout inevitable.”99 Commentators have questioned these assertions. Alex Moore 
points out that BCE was put in play through a decision of the board. He notes, “[t]o 
conclude that a buyout was inevitable overlooks the question of whether the BCE board 
could legitimately have taken steps to frustrate any change of control transaction through 
defensive tactics.”100 It is clear that the market did not compel BCE to take the actions 
that it did, rather that the actions were a voluntary decision of the board who were acting 
on the notion that they had an obligation to maximize shareholder value.101  
 
By construing the facts in such a way as to make the sale of BCE seem inevitable, the 
court sidestepped a very important issue: a board’s role when faced with a possible 
change of control transaction. It was generally accepted that directors were permitted to 
undertake defensive tactics provided that the purpose was to maximize shareholder 
value.102 Under the BCE duty it remains unclear the extent that directors will be 
permitted to pursue defensive tactics and when those tactics will be justified.103 This 
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uncertainty is amplified when one examines how securities law addresses the 
responsibility of boards during control transactions.  
 
Securities law plays an important role in regulating change of control transactions. 
Under securities law, directors are required to focus on the interests of shareholders 
when in the midst of a control transaction. National Policy 62—202 governs defensive 
tactics in Canada.104 Although the policy is not strictly enforceable, it represents the 
position of securities regulators with respect to what actions a board will be permitted to 
take when faced with a change of control transaction.  
 
The policy states that the primary objective of the take-over bid provisions in Canada is 
“the protection of the bona fide interests of the shareholders of the target company.”105 
Directors are permitted to “take action to maximize the return for shareholders.”106 There 
is a preference for auctions in the policy, which also lists different defensive tactics that 
the regulators will find to be inappropriate.107  
 
The conflicting nature of securities law and corporate law places directors in a 
precarious position when faced with a change of control transaction. On the one hand, 
securities law requires that they maximize shareholder value. On the other, corporate law 
permits directors to consider a wide range of interests above and beyond that of 
shareholders. Directors may be faced with the lose/lose proposition of being disciplined 
by the regulators or breaching their fiduciary duty. From a policy perspective this 
inconsistency is surely not advisable.   
 
C. Do As I Say, Not As I Do: The Use of Polarized Conceptions of the Corporation 
 
A final criticism of the BCE decision is based on its seeming reliance on two polarized 
theories of the corporation. As discussed briefly above, shareholder primacy and 
stakeholder theory are two principal ways in which scholars conceptualize the 
corporation’s role in society.108 These two theories have very different normative 
underpinnings and following 80 years of debate, appear incapable of reconciliation.109  
 
The Supreme Court did not acknowledge the shareholder/stakeholder debate in BCE. If 
they had, they may have realised that they were utilizing elements of both theories. The 
court relied upon many ideas associated with stakeholder theory in its analysis of the 
oppression remedy. This is not surprising given that the oppression remedy was designed 
to protect the interests of stakeholders and minority-shareholders. However, the court 
                                                
104 Take-Over Rules, supra note 102.  
105 Take-Over Rules, supra note 102 at 1.1(2) [Emphasis added].  
106 Ibid at 1.1(1).  
107 Ibid at 1.1.  
108 See Note 3.  
109 The debate can be traced back to Dodd and Berle. See, Adolf Berle, “Corporate Powers in 
Trust” (1931) 44 Harv LR 1049 [Berle]; Edwin Dodd, “For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?” (1931) 45 Harv LR 1145 [Dodd]; Adolf Berle, “For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees: A Note” (1932) 45 Harv LR 1365. 
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also utilized ideas associated with stakeholder theory when discussing the operation of 
directors’ fiduciary duties.  
 
Given the courts apparent preference towards a more stakeholder friendly model of 
corporate law, it is surprising that the ultimate decision in BCE fits squarely in line with 
what would be expected under shareholder primacy. Although BCE rejects Relvon and 
the notion that directors have an obligation to maximize shareholder value, the court 
found no fault in the board, which proceeded on the basis that their obligation required 
them to maximize shareholder value.110 The following discussion comments on this 
interesting inconsistency while further outlining stakeholder theory and shareholder 
primacy and how in BCE the court utilized both theories. 
 
i. Stakeholder Theory  
 
It should be noted from the outset that there is no definitive agreement on what 
stakeholder theory entails. Many early articulations of the theory have done so in the 
form of a negative critique towards shareholder primacy.111 Stakeholder theorists have 
begun to produce more positive arguments; however, the premise is still in its early 
stages.112 As such, the theory remains a relatively broad concept. It is clear from 
canvassing the extensive literature that stakeholder theory has differing meanings to 
different scholars. Although stakeholder theorists disagree about certain aspects of the 
theory, they are all unified in their position that corporations should not be run solely in 
the interests of shareholders. The Supreme Court agreed stating “it is important to be 
clear that the directors owe their duty to the corporation, not to shareholders...”113  
 
Stakeholder theory provides an expansive view of the corporation. Early formulations of 
the theory can be traced back to the famous debate between Professor Berle and 
Professor Dodd in the Harvard Law Review. In debating for whom managers act as 
trustees, Dodd argued that shareholder interests can be subjugated to other stakeholders 
and society at large.114 The articulation of stakeholder theory in its current form can be 
traced to R. Edward Freeman and his influential book, Strategic Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach.115  
 
Most legal scholars see stakeholder theory as part of a broader communitarian ideology. 
Stakeholder theory starts from the communitarian proposition that the purpose of the 
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corporation is to promote overall social good.116 The theory rejects the idea that a 
corporation’s sole purpose is making money. Corporations are recognized as important 
actors in society and not just an investment vehicle for owners of financial capital.117 
This broader mandate was recognized in BCE, as the court repeatedly referenced the idea 
that corporations should strive to be a “good corporate citizen.”118  
 
One reason why stakeholder theory favours a broad public mandate for corporations is 
due to their external influence. Stakeholder theory conceptualizes corporations as large 
and influential institutions whose conduct can have substantial impact on society.119 Of 
the largest 150 economic entities in the world, 95 are corporations.120 Given the powerful 
position that corporations hold, stakeholder theorists argue that corporations have an 
obligation to society. For stakeholder theorists, if corporations are permitted to focus 
solely on profit maximization, a potential opportunity for societal betterment is lost.  
 
In addition to the external influence of corporations, stakeholder theory focuses on the 
wide range of interests, which make up the corporation. The Supreme Court recognized 
this in BCE stating: “a corporation is an entity that encompasses and affects various 
individuals and groups.”121 Stakeholder theorists argue that each corporate constituent is 
integral to the success of the corporation.122 Each of these parties (not just shareholders) 
makes firm-specific investments. It would be unfair for directors to ignore the interests 
of the parties that contribute to the success of the corporation and focus only on 
shareholders. The notion of fair treatment of stakeholders was introduced in the Supreme 
Court’s discussion of the reasonable expectations doctrine under the oppression remedy: 
“The corporation and shareholders are entitled to maximize profit and share value, to be 
sure, but not by treating individual stakeholders unfairly. Fair treatment – the central 
theme running through the oppression jurisprudence – is most fundamentally what 
stakeholders are entitled to reasonable expect.”123  The courts comments parallel 
stakeholder theorist arguments that because each stakeholder contributes to the 
corporation, they should be treated fairly and benefit from their contributions.124  
 
The Supreme Court’s utilization of numerous ideas associated with stakeholder theory in 
BCE has led some commentators to argue that BCE has introduced a stakeholder model 
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of directors’ fiduciary duties to Canada.125 Although this likely overstates the impact of 
the decision, it is clear that the court emphasized the importance of stakeholders and 
ensuring that their rights are not disregarded. Notwithstanding the courts repeated 
emphasis on protecting stakeholder interests, the ultimate result of the case was that a 
bid that provided a significant premium to shareholders (and a loss to debentureholders) 
was approved. This result is in keeping with what would be expected under shareholder 
primacy and contractarian theory.  
 
ii. Shareholder Primacy and Contractarian Theory  
 
At present, contractarian theory is considered by many scholars to provide the strongest 
underpinning for shareholder primacy.126 The theory, which has become the dominant 
scholarly approach to corporate law, conceptualizes the corporation as a nexus of 
contracts.127 Early articulations of the theory can be traced back to the work of Ronald 
Coase, who suggested that the corporation served as “a vehicle that internalized the 
multiple relationships existing between the various constituencies.”128 Jensen and 
Meckling later adapted this approach. To these scholars, the corporation was a legal 
fiction that served as a nexus of contracting relationships that took place between the 
corporation and the various owners of labour, capital inputs and outputs, and 
materials.129  In order to minimize agency problems resulting from the separation of 
ownership and control, it was thought that shareholders should be given exclusive right 
to control the firm.  
 
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel added to the nexus of contract approach with their 
seminal work, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law.130 Like those before them, 
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Easterbrook and Fischel focused on the role of voluntary ordering with regard to 
corporate governance: 
 
The corporation is a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts, and 
corporate law enables the participants to select the optimal arrangement 
for the many different sets of risks and opportunities that are available in 
large economy. No one set of terms will be best for all; hence the 
‘enabling’ structure of corporate law.131   
 
Easterbrook and Fischel added further to contractarian theory with their analysis of 
shareholders’ residual claimant status. A residual claim is a claim to a share of a 
corporation’s earnings, after all debt obligations have been satisfied. For each share, a 
shareholder is entitled to the proportional value of the corporation after are all other 
debts have been paid off. Thus, shareholders “get only what is left over - but they get all 
that is left over.”132 
 
Residual claimants can be contrasted with fixed claimants. A fixed claim allows the 
holder of the claim to be paid the specific value associated with their claim. A classic 
example of a fixed claim is a bond. A bondholder is entitled to be paid back a fixed 
amount as per the terms of the bond agreement. The success of the corporation will have 
no impact on the bondholders claim. No matter how the corporation performs, fixed 
claims will be entitled to the same amount and they will be entitled to that amount before 
any residual claim is paid out. 
 
According to Easterbrook and Fischel, shareholders’ status as residual claimants justifies 
their interests being placed above all other stakeholders.133 Shareholders have an 
incentive to ensure that the corporation will be run in such a way as to maximize residual 
earnings. The more profit a corporation earns over and above their fixed claims, the 
greater the benefit for all stakeholders.   
 
In addition to shareholders’ incentive to increase residual earnings, contractarians argue 
that the ability of stakeholders to contract with the corporation places them in 
advantageous position vis-à-vis shareholders. Stakeholders have the ability to negotiate 
protections for themselves: employees enter into employment contracts and have the 
ability to negotiate the terms of those contracts, creditors enter into loan agreements that 
specify interest rates and allocate certain risks, etc. On the other hand, shareholders do 
not have the ability to set any terms in return for their investment of capital. For 
contractarians, the inability of shareholders to protect themselves through contract 
provides another justification for exclusive fiduciary protection.  
 
The result in BCE falls in line with what would be expected under a shareholder primacy 
or contractarian approach to corporate law. The board designed a process to capture the 
most value available for shareholders. Although the board considered the interests of 
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debentureholders, they were correct in dismissing them because the debentureholders 
had the ability to protect themselves through contract and failed to do so.134 As such, 
even with all of the court’s stakeholder friendly rhetoric, the shareholders were still 
ultimately successful as the bid was approved by the court. Colin Feasby has commented 
on this interesting inconsistency: 
 
[t]he Supreme Court’s reasons in BCE appear to herald a softer and gentler 
corporate law… and simultaneously deploy contractarian analysis to arrive 
at a pro-shareholder result. As a result, BCE provides no clear standard or 
guidance to boards of directors confronting similar circumstances in the 
future.135   
 
 
III. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY: THE SUPERIOR APPROACH 
 
As the previous section has shown, there are many problems associated with the BCE 
duty. This portion of the paper argues that the largest potential issue with the duty 
involves its approach to change of control transactions. Control transactions represent 
circumstances where shareholders are most vulnerable to abuse by directors. As such, 
protections must be put in place in order to ensure that shareholder interests are not 
disregarded. In order to address these concerns, this paper proposes a fiduciary duty that 
requires directors to focus exclusively on maximizing shareholder value in the change of 
control context.  
 
This section will be divided into four parts. Part I will begin by examining why the 
change of control context necessitates shareholder protection by an exclusive fiduciary 
duty. The remaining parts will propose and critically examine a variety of arguments in 
favour of shareholder wealth maximization in the change of control context.  
 
A. Why an Exclusive Duty is needed in the Change of Control Context 
 
What is it about the change of control context that makes it necessary for directors to 
focus exclusively on maximizing shareholder value? To be sure, most arguments made 
in favour of a duty to maximize shareholder value in the change of control context would 
apply with equal force to other decisions impacting a corporation. Speaking to this 
question Professor Iacobucci has argued “there is no reason to conclude that 
shareholders should suddenly matter, and that other stakeholders should suddenly recede 
in importance, when a takeover bid arises.”136  
 
This paper seeks to provide an argument as to why the change of control context 
mandates different fiduciary duties. From a practical perspective, exclusive fiduciary 
duties are not necessary outside the change of control context because directors’ interests 
are sufficiently aligned with shareholders through other means. Where a corporation is 
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operating as a going concern, shareholders are protected through legal and market-based 
incentives that fuse the interests of directors with that of shareholders.  
 
Shareholder power to elect directors provides an incentive for directors to consider the 
interests of shareholders above that of non-shareholders.137 Shareholders also have the 
ability to requisition a meeting where the entire board may be removed.138 Although 
traditionally the right to elect and remove directors has not provided a significant 
obstacle on management behavior, the current position is not as clear.139 Professors 
Hansmann and Kraakman argue that shareholders have a more powerful voice than ever 
before because institutional investors “not only give effective voice to shareholder 
interests, but promote the voice of dispersed public shareholders.”140  
 
In contrast, Professor Bainbridge has criticized the idea that shareholder-voting rights 
impact director decision-making. He observes, “in practice…even the election of 
directors, absent a proxy context, is predetermined by the existing board nominating the 
next board.”141 In addition, he points to evidence that activism among institutional 
shareholders has had little impact on director decision-making.142  
 
Ultimately, it is difficult to say with any degree of empirical certainty the extent to which 
shareholder ability to elect and remove directors impacts board decision-making. 
However, all things being equal, the election power may tip the scales slightly in the 
favour of shareholders. As Millon points out, “in cases in which management must 
choose between promoting shareholder welfare at a cost to non-shareholders or 
protecting non-shareholders at the shareholders’ expense, the existence of shareholder 
voting rights encourages management to prefer the former option.”143   
 
Executive compensation schemes provide another incentive for directors to favour the 
interests of shareholders.144 Public companies are increasingly compensating directors 
with shares and requiring them to hold a significant number of their securities.145 Indeed, 
the Canada Coalition for Good Governance lists share ownership as one of its guiding 
principles of executive compensation: “The compensation committee should require 
executives to build and maintain a significant equity investment in the company. 
                                                
137 See CBCA, supra note 6 at s 137(4).  
138 Ibid at s. 143.   
139 Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, “The Case Against the Board Veto in Takeovers” (2002) 69 U Chi L 
Rev 976.  
140 Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, “The End of History of Corporate Law” (2000) 89 Geo 
LJ 439 at 453.  
141 Bainbridge, supra note 3 at 569.  
142 Ibid at 571. 
143 Millon Redefine, supra note 117 at 261.  
144 Millon Redefine, supra note 117 at 261. 
145 Shamsud Chowdhury, “Director Compensation: The Growing Popularity of Deferred Stock 
Units” (January/February 2009) Ivey Bus J 
<http://www.iveybusinessjournal.com/article.asp?intArticle_ID=806> [Chowdhury].  
 The BCE Blunder Vol 20 24 
Consideration should be given to holding periods beyond retirement.”146 The underlying 
rationale for this type of compensation is that when directors have a financial stake in the 
corporation, they will perform their role at an optimal level. A byproduct of 
compensating directors with shares is that it gives them a pecuniary incentive to favour 
the interests of shareholders.147  
 
There are also a variety of market-based incentives that align the interests of directors 
and shareholders. These incentives are the result of pressure placed on directors to 
compete effectively in their market. Although market based incentives may not 
guarantee that management always focuses exclusively on shareholder interests, “they 
still generate systematic pressure that lead management away from costly polices 
beneficial to non-shareholders.”148  
 
Product or market competition between firms is one market-incentive that aligns the 
interests of shareholders and directors. Directors are under pressure to reduce costs in 
order to remain competitive with other firms in their industry. Millon gives the example 
of a firm deciding whether or not to shut down an old factory to reduce costs.149 Failure 
to do so may put the firm at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their competitors. Given these 
concerns, management is encouraged to pursue efficiency over non-shareholder 
interests.150 Millon also argues that focus on non-shareholder interests may put firms at a 
disadvantage when attempting to secure debt financing or additional equity financing.151 
Given the variety of incentives directors have to favour the interests of shareholders, it is 
not surprising that even strong supporters of stakeholder based models of corporate 
governance have conceded: “if there is no legal requirement that management protect 
non-shareholders, it is unlikely they will do so.”152 
 
However, the change of control context presents a circumstance where directors’ self-
interest has a greater potential to conflict with shareholder interests. When a corporation 
is changing ownership, there is a strong possibility that directors may lose their jobs.153 
Many takeovers are the result of mismanagement and provide a tool for reallocating 
economic resources to their best use. Given the negative consequences that takeover bids 
may have on directors, concern over their livelihood may take precedent over and above 
the legal and market incentives, which tie their interests to that of shareholders.  
 
In order to avoid potential self-interested actions, it is necessary that directors involved 
in change of control transactions have an obligation to look exclusively towards the 
interests of shareholders when making decisions. Market incentives no longer function to 
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align the interests of directors with shareholders, as it is unlikely they will be working 
with the company in the near future. If directors can justify their decision-making on the 
basis that it protects the welfare of a given stakeholder, they are presented with the 
opportunity to act in their own interests. Although most directors will not act on such an 
opportunity, legal constraints are nonetheless necessary in order to achieve adequate 
shareholder protection.  
 
In addition, a standard that requires directors to maximize shareholder value in the 
change of control context is more efficient than the BCE duty. All control transactions 
ultimately need to be approved by shareholders. If directors recommend a transaction 
that benefits stakeholders at the expense of shareholders, it is unlikely that shareholders 
will approve it. Requiring directors to consider the interests of the party making the 
ultimate determination is a logical policy choice.  
 
Whether an exclusive fiduciary duty provides the best means of protecting shareholders 
is a matter of debate. It could be argued that the use of a special committee composed of 
independent directors, in addition to fairness opinions by independent advisors, are 
sufficient methods of ensuring that self-interested directors do not taint decisions. This 
paper takes the position that although there are other mechanisms that can be used to 
protect shareholders, fiduciary duties are best suited at doing so.154 The following parts 
will examine certain arguments in favour of shareholder primacy and why it is the 
preferable approach to dealing with control transactions.  
 
B. Shareholder Primacy Provides a Coherent and Enforceable Duty  
 
In contrast to the uncertain and indeterminate BCE duty, one of the strongest arguments 
in favour of shareholder primacy in the change of control context is that it provides a 
coherent and enforceable rule that is easy for directors to follow. Directors have a clear 
measuring stick on which to base their decisions.  In addition, shareholder wealth 
maximization provides a strong enforcement mechanism for misbehaving directors. 
Shareholder primacy “draws the clearest line between decisions that breach the fiduciary 
duty [and those that do not].”155 Directors can be monitored relatively easily when their 
performance is measured through inspection of share price. Robert Clark put it this way: 
 
A single objective goal like profit maximization is more easily monitored 
than a multiple, vaguely defined goal like the fair and reasonable 
accommodation of all affected interest…. Assuming shareholders have 
some control mechanisms, better monitoring means that corporate 
managers will be kept more accountable. They are more likely to do what 
they are supposed to do and do it efficiently.156  
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Shareholder primacy provides a simplified standard for courts to determine whether a 
director has breached his or her fiduciary duty. Easy monitoring will improve corporate 
efficiencies and reduce agency costs.157 During control transactions, directors would be 
required to show that a transaction is in the best interests of shareholders. This 
determination would primarily focus on share price; however, other considerations such 
as deal certainty, fairness opinions and formal valuations would factor in as well.  
 
Although shareholder primacy provides a coherent framework for directorial 
accountability it is not without its flaws. Determining what is in the “best interests of 
shareholders” may prove to be difficult, if not impossible.158 What one shareholder may 
perceive to be in their best interests may contrast starkly with the views of another. 
Shareholders may have different investment horizons.159 While long-term investors may 
focus on the lasting viability of the corporation, other shareholders, such as arbitrageurs, 
may focus exclusively on short-term returns. Further, the makeup of a shareholder’s 
portfolio may impact their perceived best interests. The interests of diversified 
shareholders will be very different from the interests of undiversified shareholders.160  
 
While shareholder interests are by no means monolithic, of all corporate constituents 
they are the most likely to agree on a given issue. There is no other stakeholder group as 
homogenous as shareholders.161 Employee interests may conflict on relative wages and 
on many of the “firm’s investment decisions, such as which plants to keep open, which 
processes to automate, or where to improve safety.”162 Similarly, secured and unsecured 
creditors’ interests may be substantially divided, “secured creditors will generally be less 
hostile to increases in firm risk than will unsecureds, since they are better protected in 
the event of insolvency.”163 Shareholders, on the other hand, are likely to be unified in 
their desire to increase the residual value of the corporation.  
 
In any event, the fact that shareholder interests diverge does not provide a strong 
argument for having directors consider additional divergent interests. As pointed out by 
James Hanks: “[i]t is a non sequitur to argue that because it is difficult for directors to 
determine the best interests of a large, diverse group of stockholders, the directors should 
therefore be authorized to determine the best interests of an even larger, more diverse 
group of nonshareholders.”164  
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Focusing specifically on control transactions, concerns regarding shareholder divergence 
may be overstated. Although other strategic decisions may generate controversy among 
shareholders, a change of control transaction will likely unify shareholders. When it 
becomes clear that the corporation is to be sold, rational shareholders will seek to 
maximize the value of their investment. Although there may be differences as to what 
qualifies as an acceptable price, shareholders will be united in wanting to obtain the best 
value available for their investment.   
 
C. Protecting Stakeholders in the Change of Control Context                                                                     
 
Critics of shareholder primacy argue that change of control transactions allow 
shareholders to transfer stakeholder wealth to themselves. Speaking of the American 
hostile takeover market in the 1980s, Karmel notes: “bondholders have complained that 
the size of a takeover premium reflected a portion of their capital.”165 Often, employees 
complain they have been deprived of their human capital contributions to a corporation 
when layoffs followed a takeover.166  
 
Stakeholder theorists have argued that the gains experienced by shareholders during 
hostile takeovers come at the expense of stakeholders. In economic terms, it was argued 
that shareholder gains were redistributed from labour or bondholders. As time passed, 
scholars began to question the empirical validity of the redistribution argument. Studies 
now show that the gain shareholders collect during change of control transactions do not 
come at the expense of stakeholders.167 Daniels explains the situation in this way: 
 
In most cases, both the shareholders and the stakeholders lost the 
investment made in the stakeholders’ firm specific capital. If a corporation 
is forced to displace a stakeholder whose firm-specific capital has 
depreciated more quickly than anticipated, this is a loss both for the 
corporation (that is, shareholders) and the stakeholder. The reason why 
shareholders gain – despite the loss related to obsolete stakeholder firm-
specific capital – is that there are other related gains (synergies, improved 
management, monopoly profits, tax benefits) from a takeover that are split 
between acquiring and target shareholders.168  
 
Thus, the gains created for shareholders during hostile takeovers exceed the combined 
losses felt by stakeholders.  
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It is also clear that although shareholder gains are not redistributive, stakeholder interests 
may nonetheless suffer as a result of control transactions. Stakeholders form an integral 
part of any successful corporation and have valid interests worth protecting. Control 
transactions may result in stakeholders suffering considerable losses. For example: 
employees have sometimes lost their jobs, endured pension benefit reductions and 
decreases in wages, creditors may suffer as a result of increased debt load, which reduces 
the value of their products, and local communities may lose tax revenue.  
 
Stakeholder theorists argue that protections need to be put in place to mitigate any 
damages resulting from control transactions. There is a plethora of thought regarding 
how best to ensure that stakeholder interests are not disregarded. Some commentators 
argue that stakeholders should be given seats on boards.169 Others feel that fiduciary 
protection provides the best solution.170 This paper argues that stakeholder protection is 
most effectively dealt with outside the realm of fiduciary protection through the 
mechanisms of contract, legislation and the political process. Although individually 
these modes of protection suffer from different short-fallings, collectively they provide 
an effective regime for ensuring that the interests of stakeholders are upheld. At the same 
time, by using these protective mechanisms rather than fiduciary duties, concerns 
regarding diluted duties and the accompanying potential for management opportunism 
are reduced.171 The following sub-parts will examine the protection mechanisms of 




Stakeholder’s first line of protection is afforded through their ability to contract with the 
corporation. Stakeholders have the “technological” ability to protect their interests 
through agreement.172 Stakeholders can shield themselves against almost every type of 
director misbehavior by retaining negative control over the corporation’s operations. 
Bondholders, workers and even local communities have the ability to protect their 
interests by contracting for the right to veto future proposed action by directors.173  
 
Speaking specifically to the change of control context, stakeholders have a wide range of 
contractual mechanisms they can utilize in order to protect their interests. Workers and 
employees can negotiate golden parachutes.174 Creditors, such as bondholders, can 
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utilize poison put and control and credit rating covenants.175 Stakeholder’s ability to 
protect themselves through contract places them in a unique and favourable position. 
Although fiduciary duties provide broad and sweeping protection, they do so in the form 
of gap filling devices. Macey makes the point that “fiduciary duties only operate in the 
shadow of the express contractual arrangements that nonshareholders constituencies 
have with the firm.”176 Thus, in the change of control context, fiduciary duties to 
maximize shareholder value do not void any contractual protections that stakeholders 
have in place. Shareholders are entitled to maximize value, but only after all contractual 
obligations are honoured.  
 
Although contracting provides a powerful tool for stakeholder self-protection, there are a 
number of practical impediments, which reduce its effectiveness in certain situations.177 
Firstly, it is difficult for parties to plan for all future contingencies when drafting a 
contract. Unforeseen circumstances may arise and attempting to plan for every 
eventuality through contract is impossible. Further, asymmetric information between 
contracting parties reduces the potential for meaningful protection of stakeholders. 
Daniels points out serious infirmities that plague the stakeholder-corporation bargaining 
environment: 
 
Information regarding the likelihood and magnitude of certain events may 
be unavailable or mistaken. Endemic agency problems may hobble the 
capacity of various stakeholder groups, for example, organized labour, to 
negotiate effectively, with management… [Further] certain legal 
infirmities may impair the capacity of stakeholders to enforce corporate 
undertakings.178 
 
It is clear that, in many circumstances, the reality of contractual formation impedes 
stakeholders from achieving meaningful self-protection. In certain situations judges may 
be relied upon to provide “gap-filling functions”179; however, judicial ex-post protection 
brings with it additional costs and elements of uncertainty.180    
 
In addition, disparity of bargaining position between stakeholders and the corporation 
may prevent stakeholders from negotiating meaningful contractual protection. As 
described by Zumbansen and Archer, “not all contracting parties engage in the 
bargaining process with the same pedigree of expertise and freedom from coercion.”181 
Although some stakeholders have the ability to contract with the corporation, those in 
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weak bargaining positions are unable to do so in any meaningful sense. Many times 
those stakeholders are faced with a take it or leave it proposition.182 Even those 
stakeholders who have the opportunity to negotiate with the corporation may be 
prevented from achieving meaningful protection as they cannot foresee preserved risks 
or protect themselves effectively.  
 
ii. Legislation  
 
Given contracting is not always effective at protecting stakeholders, further protections 
are necessary. The use of legislation provides another tool for ensuring that stakeholder 
interests are not disregarded. According to Daniels, “a preferable way of thinking about 
stakeholder injury is through the prism of contractual failure… [as such] state 
intervention expands the range and effectiveness of instruments that can be used to 
protect stakeholders and improve societal welfare.”183 In situations where contracting is 
unable to provide an effective protection mechanism legislation has been used and there 
exists an extensive body of law that ensures that stakeholders are not disregarded.184  
 
iii. Lobbying and the Political Process  
 
Although legislation provides a good deal of protection for stakeholders, new 
circumstances may arise where stakeholders are put at additional risk. In those situations, 
the ability of stakeholders to engage in the political process provides a further 
mechanism of protection.185 Many stakeholder groups are part of larger concerted 
political lobbying organizations.186 These groups are able to exercise considerable 
political pressure on governments to enact legislation that protects their interests. As 
noted by Professor Fisch, “[o]ther corporate stakeholders may have particular 
advantages in political participation relative to shareholders. Their interests may be 
aligned along a range of political issues. They may be repeat players. They may have 
greater stakes.”187 In contrast, shareholders are for the most part scattered individuals 
and organizations with little or no political voice.  
 
The ability of stakeholder groups to lobby government is evident through the wide array 
of legislative mechanisms currently in place to protect stakeholders. The 1960s and 
1970s introduced an assortment of social welfare legislation. These laws provided 
protection for a variety of stakeholders including employees and the environment. As 
noted by Professor Winkler: 
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Unlike corporate law reforms, however, social welfare legislation of this 
period sought to cabin managerial discretion over important aspects of 
hiring, operations and production. Although this vast array of social 
welfare legislation is not corporate law per se, it remains a vibrant 
constraint on managerial decision-making, adopted in the name of non-
shareholder constituencies of corporations.188  
 
Stakeholders’ capacity to interact with government to create specifically tailored 
legislative responses to their concerns gives them an advantage versus shareholders who 
have less leverage and ability to do so.   
 
Government also provides a better forum for making trade-offs between the various 
interests at stake.189 Directors are ill suited at making determinations of public welfare as 
they lack the necessary information, training and resources to do so effectively.190 
Politicians and legislatures are much better positioned to make these types of decisions.  
They are able to debate and research a wide array of solutions and decide on the best 
alternative. They are also politically accountable for any decisions that they make.191  
 
D. Shareholders Bear the Greatest Risk  
 
The preceding part outlined various mechanisms that protect the interests of 
stakeholders. This part will argue that in the change of control context, shareholders find 
themselves in the position bearing the most risk.192 Unlike stakeholders who are afforded 
the protections mentioned above, shareholders are left almost exclusively to the mercy of 
directors. Given shareholders’ vulnerable position, the most effective way of protecting 
their interests in the change of control context is through an exclusive fiduciary duty to 
maximize shareholder value.  
 
Shareholders do not have the ability to contract with the corporation. When purchasing 
shares, the corporation always sets the terms and there is no ability to alter them. As 
such, shareholders do not have the ability to protect themselves through contract. This 
leaves them to rely upon legislative and market-based protections. However, as argued 
above, these protection mechanisms may not function effectively in the change of 
control context due to agency problems and concerns regarding self-interested directors. 
193   
 
Shareholders also have the most to lose because of their residual claimant status. The 
nature of shareholders’ residual claim means that they are only entitled to what is left 
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after all fixed claims have been paid off.194 Shareholders are the only corporate 
constituents to make investments in the company without any contractual guarantee of a 
specific return.  
 
Given shareholders vulnerable position, they have a vested interest in monitoring board 
actions to ensure that directors remain accountable. However, the widely dispersed 
nature of shareholders makes it difficult and expensive to do so effectively.195 Unlike 
other stakeholders who have a greater ability to mobilize to protect their interests, 
collective action problems prevent shareholders from achieving meaningful oversight of 
directors.196  
 
Professor Sheehy has argued that shareholders’ ability to sell their stock results in less 
risk compared to other stakeholders who are unable to leave their investment easily.197 
Although shareholders are free to sell their shares at any point, they will likely still bear 
the costs of director misdeed at the time of their exit. In addition, shareholders will not 
have all the necessary information to make a proper determination of whether or not to 
sell off their shares. Finally, as pointed out by Minow, the rise of institutional investors 
“has given us a class of shareholders who are just too big to sell out of a company every 
time they disagree with management.”198  
 
Fiduciary protection is the most effective means of ensuring that shareholder interests 
are not subverted. If directors are aware their actions will be monitored against an easily 
determinable standard, they will be less likely to subvert the interests of shareholders. 
According to Professor Fisch, fiduciary duties are particularly well suited for protecting 
shareholder interests: 
 
Because the interests of managers, employees, creditors, customers, and 
suppliers, are adequately protected through other institutions, there is little 
need for judicial intervention. Shareholders, however, are relatively 
disabled from using these institutions effectively. As a result, shareholder 
primacy affords shareholders access to other institutional actors: the 
courts. Fiduciary duty cases provide a mechanism through which 
shareholders can trigger a lawmaking process that protects their distinctive 
interests.199  
 
Through the use of the courts, shareholders can obtain remedies for director 
misbeaviour. Collective action problems will be minimized, as judicial redress does not 
require the mobilization of all shareholders. Through devices such as securities class 
action, courts provide individual investors an effective remedy for director misbehavior.  
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In conclusion, this paper raises a number of concerns with regard to the fiduciary duty 
set out in the BCE decision. In particular, it was argued that the indeterminate nature of 
the BCE duty left directors with little guidance for dealing with change of control 
transactions. In addition, the court’s use of competing theoretical conceptions of the 
corporation was criticized for further complicating the meaning of the decision.  
 
The paper went on to argue that directors’ fiduciary duties should require them to focus 
exclusively on increasing shareholder value in the change of control context. The main 
justification for such a rule is that it provides an enforceable standard for evaluating the 
actions of directors. Shareholders require an exclusive fiduciary duty as they face the 
greatest risk of their interests being overlooked. In contrast, fiduciary protection is not 
necessary for stakeholders as they have a variety of other mechanisms to ensure that 
their interests are not disregarded.  
 
In BCE it seems as though the Supreme Court attempts to steer Canadian corporate law 
towards a more stakeholder friendly model.200 If this is indeed the case, questions 
emerge as to whether the courts are the best institution to make such policy decisions. 
The current corporate governance system in Canada is shareholder focused. The 
overarching role of shareholders in corporate governance is the result of not just 
fiduciary duties, but other market and legal mechanisms. Shareholders have the ability to 
vote on many fundamental transactions and are free to call a meeting and discharge 
directors. Securities law places significant importance on protecting shareholder interests 
in the change of control context. There are also a variety of market forces that align the 
interests of directors with that of shareholders.201  
 
Although stakeholders have rights under corporate law, they are largely remedial in 
nature. The oppression remedy provides stakeholders with a tool to redress corporate 
wrongs perpetrated against them but does not give them a say in how the corporation is 
to be governed.202 Only shareholders have been given rights, which allow them to impact 
the governance of a corporation.  
 
If Canada prefers to introduce a corporate governance model that gives more say to 
various stakeholders, fundamental changes to corporate and securities laws are required. 
Simply altering the fiduciary duty is not enough. All the Supreme Court has achieved 
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through its articulation of fiduciaries duty in BCE, is an indeterminate standard which 
compromises the ability to effectively monitor boards. 
 
In addition, the decision as to whether a stakeholder or shareholder approach should be 
adopted in Canada is better undertaken through parliamentary process. When the United 
Kingdom decided to alter their corporate fiduciary duties, they commissioned a 
parliamentary committee to research and recommend a course of action.203 The changes 
were debated in parliament and ultimately approved. Given the complicated nature of 
corporate legislation, parliament is better suited at making these types of decisions.  
Unfortunately this was not the case and we are now left waiting on the courts to further 
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